Before France conducted airstrikes on Isis’ stronghold in Syria on Sunday night, Pierre Haski pondered whether the Paris attacks would force France to change its Syria policy:
"Hollande’s Syria strategy is central to the debate. France was the first, and the quickest, back in 2012, to recognise the opposition Syrian National Coalition as the “unique representative” of the Syrian people, thus breaking with Bashar al-Assad’s government. Since then, this “moderate” opposition has not delivered, more and more marginalised as it is by the growing presence and strength of jihadi groups, including the so-called Islamic State, which claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks.
Worse for Hollande, his numerous calls for Assad’s removal from power, or even “elimination” as French foreign minister Laurent Fabius once said, have suffered several setbacks, isolating France as the diplomatic scene shifted.
"[...] Until Friday, the French government was still insisting on Assad’s departure as a precondition for any political settlement in Syria, putting the Syrian president on a par with Isis in blame for the country’s tragedy. But France has become more and more isolated in this stand, with Russia and Iran increasingly pushing their agenda. The US listened. Only Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have applauded the French attitude, rewarding it with big arms deals.
Hollande’s Syria strategy was caught between Putin’s offensive and Obama’s reluctance. He had chosen the high moral ground, refusing to associate either with a brutal regime or a bloody opposition, but this was not necessarily the most practical option in a situation that involves choosing the least bad option rather than the best one.
Have the Paris attacks changed the rules of the game? Both Hollande and his prime minister, Manuel Valls, proclaimed in martial words that the enemy is Isis, and that France’s response would be merciless. Has the shift been made from having two enemies to one?
No comments:
Post a Comment